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We present a mean field model for the phase diagram of a community of micro-organisms, inter-
acting through their metabolism so that they are, in effect, engaging in a cooperative social game.
We show that as a function of the concentration of the nutrients glucose and histidine, the com-
munity undergoes a phase transition separating a state in which one strain is dominant to a state
which is characterized by coexisting populations. Our results are in good agreement with recent
experimental results, correctly reproducing quantitative trends and predicting the phase diagram.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Cc, 87.18.Gh
Cooperative phenomena in biology are difficult to treat
because of the complexity and heterogeneity of the inter-
actions, but a qualitatively successful approach is cooper-
ative game theory—the effort to encapsulate the complex
interactions into parameters describing the binary out-
come of pairwise interactions between individuals[1–7].
The central element in game theory is the payoff matrix,
which describes the score accruing to each member of an
interacting pair depending upon their action in the game.
For example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the two players
can either “cooperate” or “defect”. Mutual cooperation
yields a reward R, whilst if both defect, they receive a
punishment P . If one defects and the other cooperates,
the defector receives a temptation T while the coopera-
tor receives the sucker’s payoff S. If T > R > P > S,
then there is a dilemma: a rational player would defect
to receive the highest payoff independent of the state of
the other player, so that if both parties play rationally,
each will end up with the punishment P . However, if
they had both cooperated, they would have received the
reward R.
Two-body interactions are paradoxical in cooperative
games, a forceful indicator of how collective effects can
override selfish one-body behavior. If the the payoff ma-
trix instead obeyed the inequalities T > R > S > P , then
the rational strategy is to do the opposite of the other
player. This condition leads to the so-called Snowdrift
Game, which corresponds to a coexistence of players.
Such seemingly abstract games have biological realiza-
tions in the dynamics of microbes and viruses. In a recent
experiment, a game theory payoff matrix was manipu-
lated by genetically engineering Saccharomyces cerevisiae
(budding yeast)[8]. Budding yeast’s primary carbon in-
take is a monosaccharide, such as glucose and fructose.
In a monosaccharide-absent environment, dormant genes
are derepressed to digest alternative nutrients, such as
disaccharide maltose and sucrose[9]. In the experiment,
wild-type cooperative strains have an intact SUC2 gene,
which codes enzyme invertase to hydrolyze sucrose into
glucose and fructose. However, 99% of the product is re-
leased back into the media, giving rise to the possibility
that mutant defectors with the SUC2 gene knocked out
could make use of the metabolite without having to pay
the price of manufacturing glucose. In order to tune the
cost of cooperation and hence the payoff matrix, the au-
thors engineered cooperators to be histidine auxotrophs,
relying on histidine importation from the media. Having
an intact histidine gene, defectors are not affected. Thus
limitation of histidine concentration in the media coerces
the metabolism of cooperators, increases the cost of coop-
eration, and thus affects the payoff matrix. By changing
the glucose and histidine concentration provided with a
fixed portion of sucrose, the authors empirically obtained
a transition from the dominance of defectors, which cor-
responds to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, to the coexistence
of both strains, which is a Snowdrift Game. The ability
to manipulate collective properties of the microbial world
by genetic engineering is impressive, but what is lacking
is a predictive understanding of the direct dependence of
cooperator fraction on nutrition concentrations.
The purpose of this paper is to build up a phenomeno-
logical model linking game theory and experimental mea-
surable quantities. We calculate the population struc-
ture, i.e. the fraction for cooperators and defectors, at
different glucose and histidine concentrations, and repro-
duce the phase diagram for the transition from dom-
inance of a single strain to coexistence of both. We
use phenomenological game theory because the collec-
tive effects here are highly nonlinear due to complex
metabolism. Our model implies a consistent nonlinearity
responsible for both yeast growth and glucose produc-
tion.
The interactions between cooperative and defective
strains are complicated for the following two reasons.
First, there are two kinds of nutritional molecules: su-
crose and glucose as sketched in Fig. (1). Sucrose is easy
to handle because it has a single source and single mode
of consumption, originating from the media and being
consumed only by cooperators. However, glucose has
two sources: the initial amount added into the media,
and the local increment from sucrose decomposition by
cooperators. The actual glucose concentration surround-
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2FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic of nutrient flows in the
experiment of Ref. [8]. Sucrose is hydrolyzed in the periplas-
matic space (grey) of cooperators. The majority of the glucose
produced diffuses back to the media, from which both strains
import glucose.
ing yeast cells depends on the cooperators’ metabolism
and concentration, whose relation is unknown. Second,
in sucrose hydrolysis, cooperators experience a cost to
synthesize invertase, but at the same time gain in gen-
erating glucose for themselves. The balance between the
cost and benefit is subtle and hard to handle. In order
to circumvent these two obstacles, we model a simple sit-
uation where the two strains are at the same nutrition
level. This should be applicable to the experimental sit-
uation because cooperative strains ultimately live on the
monosaccharide glucose no matter if it is absorbed from
the surrounding media or decomposed from sucrose. In
this way, our system can be simplified as a coexistence
problem of two strains living on the same nutrition glu-
cose.
Next we use game theory to identify the conditions for
coexistence. The key is to construct a payoff matrix with
experimental data. Here, the two strains are engaging in
a cooperative game: if the payoff for defectors exceeds
that of cooperators, defectors will dominate; if the pay-
off for cooperators exceeds that of defectors, cooperators
will dominate. Therefore only when the payoffs for both
parties are equal, will coexistence be achieved. The pay-
off for players is the mean fitness for strains, which is
measured as the growth rate. Thus, our next task is to
construct the dependency of growth rates on experimen-
tal observable quantities. We do this below using a mean
field theory, modeled after the way in which cooperative
interactions leading to ferromagnetism are described by
an effective local field that adds to the externally applied
magnetic field (see, e.g. Ref. [10]).
The first input is the nonlinear dependency of growth
rate b (hr−1) on glucose concentration g (%) according
to the experiment[8]:
b = γ1g
α, (1)
where γ1 = 0.44, α = 0.15 and g is 0.001 ∼ 0.03%. In
Eq. (1), the growth rate b varies nonlinearly with glucose
concentration g. The nonlinear power α is unusual, and
reflects cellular constraints, such as the nonlinear per-
formance of hexose transporters and catabolic pathway
enzymes. We cannot use first principles system biology to
justify the nonlinear α, because the basic metabolic net-
works etc are not well enough understood. Instead, we
make a very simplified assumption: we interpret the non-
linearity as primarily reflecting aspects of the efficiency
of hexose transporters across the cell membrane. Hence
Eq. (1) implies that translocation flux rate through the
membrane is proportional to the concentration raised to
a nonlinear power α. Note that in principle, such translo-
cation processes are influenced by the metabolism of the
cells, but for now we regard that as negligible.
Second, we include the presence of cooperators. Now,
there are two sources of glucose. Besides the initial glu-
cose added into the media, cooperators also produce glu-
cose from sucrose decomposition. At the mean field level,
every cooperator manufactures glucose at about the same
rate. We assume that this rate does not have a signifi-
cant dependence on the metabolism of cells; because the
amount of invertase in each cell is not influenced by the
metabolism, we assume that the performance of invertase
is also not significantly influenced by the metabolism.
Since the sucrose concentration is kept the same through-
out the experiment, there is no need for us to explore the
detailed form of such a production rate. The total glucose
produced inside all the cooperator cells is thus propor-
tional to the cooperator fraction f . Eq. (1) implies that
the glucose imported into the cell scales as gα due to the
cellular constraints on the molecular translocation pro-
cess. The same translocation passage limits the glucose
output from cooperators, as evidenced by the report that
the diffusion coefficient through the cell wall is anoma-
lously small, estimated to be 1/20 of that in water[8].
Hence the flux of glucose released is proportional to the
glucose produced inside the cells raised to the power α.
Since the glucose manufactured inside the cells is propor-
tional to the cooperator fraction f , the glucose contribu-
tion from cooperators is proportional to fα with some
coefficient of proportionality. We denote the coefficient
as γ. As we note in the discussion about Eq. (1), the
translocation process is affected by the metabolism of the
cells. The coefficient γ, in this way, represents a general
discount factor due to metabolism, which is a combined
effect of the artificial discount in histidine limitation and
the natural cost in cooperation. Hence, we obtain the
growth rate for defectors
bd = γ1(g + γf
α)α, (2)
where γ is a general discount factor that varies with his-
tidine concentration, reflecting the artificial discount in
histidine limitation and the natural cost of cooperation.
3Third, we analyze the situation for cooperators. Com-
pared with defectors, when they import glucose from
the media, the translocation process is influenced by the
metabolism as we learn from Eq. (1). Such a discount,
representing a combined effect of the artificial discount in
histidine limitation and the natural cost in cooperation,
is represented by the same γ as in Eq. (2), because the
same cellular processes are involved. Thus we obtain
bc = γγ1(g + γf
α)α, (3)
where bc is the growth rate for cooperators. Last, we re-
call that there is a small amount of glucose that cooper-
ators reserve for themselves. This amount is determined
by the sucrose concentration and the cell’s metabolism
and transport processes, which are mediated by the his-
tidine concentration. Since the sucrose concentration is
always 5% during the experiment, we denote the benefit
for a single cooperator cell by ζ, a single-variable function
of histidine concentration only. Including this benefit for
cooperation, we finally obtain
bc = γγ1(g + γf
α)α + ζ. (4)
Eqs. (2) and (4) compose the central part of our model,
including the contribution of cooperators to the increase
in glucose concentration by the term γfα. This model
balances the cost γ for cooperators with the benefit ζ,
both depending only on histidine concentrations. Note
that as the cooperator fraction f increases, more glucose
is trapped in cooperators, but the amount per cooperator
does not change. The positivity of ζ is essential for the
survival of cooperators, which makes it possible for the
two engineered strains to engage in a snowdrift game.
In our model of cooperation, we have input three non-
trivial arguments: (i) The two α’s in Eqs. (2) and (4)
are the same, representing the same translocation pas-
sage limitation on the glucose flux both into and out of
yeast cells; (ii) The two γ’s in Eq. (4) are the same,
implying the same discount in yeasts’ growth and su-
crose decomposition by cost of cooperation mediated by
histidine limitation; (iii) ζ is a single-variable function
of histidine concentration, representing that cooperators
are compensated for production of glucose.
Our arguments above motivated points (i)-(iii) assum-
ing that it is primarily the phenomenology of transport of
glucose through the cell membrane which is the growth-
rate determining factor. However, in principle, other
metabolic effects can be present. To test whether or not
our assumptions are self-consistent and represent a good
representation of the data, we compare the predictions
of our equations with the data.
Ideally, we would like to be able to calculate the coop-
erator fraction as a function of glucose and histidine con-
centrations (Fig. 3 (b) of Ref. [8]) from theory, but this
would require a detailed description of the metabolism
and growth dynamics of the organisms to obtain the pa-
rameters. As an alternative approach, we input experi-
mental data to our equations and verify the consistency
of our modeling by checking the standard deviations for
different sets of data. Based on our reasoning from game
theory that the growth rates for cooperators and defec-
tors are the same at equilibrium, the measured growth
rates of cocultures as a function of glucose and histidine
concentrations (Fig. 3(c) of Ref. [8]) should be valid
for either strain. Interpreting them as the growth rates
for defectors, we can import the data in Fig. 3(b-c) of
Ref. [8] for various glucose and histidine concentrations
into Eq. (2) and calculate the discount γ. According to
our argument (i), we predict that γ should be the same
at the same histidine concentration but different glucose
concentrations; this is supported by the standard devi-
ations shown in Table I. We neglect the data for very
small cooperator fractions, especially for the extinction
of cooperators, such as those when histidine concentra-
tion is as low as 0.005, since they will either generate
large deviation with very small bias in measurement or
cause the cooperation term γfα to vanish. Averaging
among different glucose concentrations, we can see that
the discount γ gets smaller when histidine is more di-
lute. The first two σγ are calculated with six data points
where glucose concentration (%) ranges from 0.001 to
0.03. The latter two are smaller than the first two since
fewer data are averaged. The smallness of the standard
deviations has not been hard-wired into our model, and
substantiates our assumption (i) because otherwise they
might be orders of magnitude larger, as we will illustrate
as follows. We show in Table II the average of γ and
its corresponding standard deviation σγ if the increment
of glucose concentration varied not with the same power
α as we have assumed in our model, but linearly with
cooperator fraction, as we might have initially guessed,
bd = γ1(g + γf)
α, (5)
or even quadratically
bd = γ1(g + γf
2)α. (6)
The standard deviations σγ in Table II are at least two
orders of magnitude larger than those in Table I, and are
even higher for the fit to Eq. (6). The comparison among
these tables demonstrates that the standard deviation is
a good test of our assumption, and hence justifies the
self-consistency of our theory.
TABLE I. Cost γ for cooperators at various histidine concen-
trations.
[his]/(20 µg ml−1) 1 0.2 0.05 0.02
γ 0.19 0.14 0.061 0.027
standard deviation σγ 0.02 0.02 0.006 0.006
4TABLE II. Large standard deviation σγ to fit Eq. (5) in
violation of assumption (i).
[his]/(20 µg ml−1) 1 0.2 0.05 0.02
γ 1.8 12 12 8
standard deviation σγ 1.5 9 7 4
TABLE III. Benefit ζ for cooperators at various histidine con-
centrations.
[his]/(20 µg ml−1) 1 0.2 0.05 0.02
ζ 0.269 0.260 0.241 0.222
standard deviation σζ 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.02
Next, we interpret the data in Fig. 3(c) of Ref. [8] as
growth rates for cooperators and plug in the values of γ
shown in Table I into Eq. (4). Our arguments (ii) and
(iii) predict that ζ depends only on histidine concentra-
tion, which is consistent with the standard deviation for ζ
in Table III. The benefit for cooperators diminishes with
the limitation in histidine. The latter two σζ are bigger
than the previous two since we extend the data for those
FIG. 2. (Color online) (a) Theoretical result for cooperator
fraction at various glucose and histidine concentrations. (b)
Corresponding experimental result for cooperator fraction at
various glucose and histidine concentrations.
not incorporated in the calculation of γ in Table I. Over-
all, however, these consistency checks are successful, a
result that we emphasize is not “built-in” to our theory.
With the cost γ and gain ζ in hand, we can now predict
the cooperator fraction at equilibrium. Setting bd = bc in
Eq. (2) and (4), we plot the predicted cooperator fraction
in Fig. (2a). As a comparison, we replot the correspond-
ing data from experiment[8] in Fig. (2b). The similar-
ity between the theoretical calculation and experimental
measurement is striking and supports our model.
We have proposed a phenomenological model for wild-
type cooperative and mutant defective strains in a mixed
media of glucose and sucrose. We circumvented the
obstacle of modeling sucrose decomposition, which in-
creases glucose concentration, incurs a cost as invertase
syntheses for cooperators, and rewards them with a small
fraction of the glucose produced, by attributing cost and
benefit for cooperation to growth rates. Then we de-
termined the dependency of growth rates for defectors
and cooperators on experimental quantities such as glu-
cose and histidine concentrations. Despite our approxi-
mations, such as averaging over different glucose concen-
trations, the resulting calculation of cooperator fraction
at equilibrium is consistent with experimental observa-
tions. So what did we actually predict? By requiring
that bd = bc, we thus found, in a non-circular way, the
condition for the phase boundary separating the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma phase from the Snowdrift phase of the
system. Our mean field arguments also predict the trend,
i.e. the sign of ∂f/∂g for fixed histidine concentration.
These methods could be useful in the design of future
experiments to manipulate collective properties of micro-
organism communities.
We thank Jeff Gore for sharing with us his experimen-
tal data, and Kirill Korolev for helpful comments on the
manuscript. This work was partly supported by National
Science Foundation grant number NSF-EF-0526747.
[1] J. Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cam-
bridge Univ Press, 1982).
[2] C. Hauert and G. Szabo´, Am. J. Phys. 73, 405 (2005).
[3] R. Axelrod, D. Axelrod, and K. Pienta, Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 103, 13474 (2006).
[4] M. Nowak, Science 314, 1560 (2006).
[5] J. Prosser et al., Nature Rev. Microbiol. 5, 384 (2007).
[6] T. Antal, H. Ohtsuki, J. Wakeley, P. Taylor, and
M. Nowak, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 106, 8597 (2009).
[7] A. Traulsen et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 107, 2962
(2010).
[8] J. Gore, H. Youk, and A. Van Oudenaarden, Nature 459,
253 (2009).
[9] J. Gancedo, Micro. and Mol. Biol. Rev. 62, 334 (1998).
[10] N. Goldenfeld, Lectures on phase transitions and the
renormalization group (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,
1992).
